Can Climate Data Be Sued? – Watts Up With That?

When climate “risk” turns into a weapon, the courts eventually notice. The recent lawsuit by Andrew and Eri Uerkwitz against Zillow and First Street Technologies may well mark a turning point in the growing entanglement of climate data, real estate markets, and the casual use of fear to move public sentiment and private profit.

The case, filed in New York County Superior Court, stems from Zillow’s partnership with First Street Technology—a private firm that produces so-called “climate risk data.” The couple’s Chappaqua home, a modest 2,313-square-foot property listed for $1.15 million, carried an ominous flood-risk score of 9 out of 10 on Zillow, indicating “extreme risk.” According to the complaint, this label caused the property to be “stigmatized as materially unsellable at its actual market value,” leading to the eventual sale of the home at a $100,000 loss.

The Uerkwitzes’ experience wasn’t unique—it was simply the first to reach the courts. Buyers, after seeing the 9/10 “extreme flood risk” rating, walked away. The lawsuit contends that the supposed 99% probability of flooding within 30 years was not just exaggerated, but false—contradicting FEMA flood zone maps, on-site inspections, and even the basic topography of the property. As the complaint notes, “The property is not located in a FEMA flood zone, has never flooded, does not require flood insurance, and includes topographical and structural features that preclude a credible risk of flooding”.

This is the first real-world consequence of what might be called algorithmic climate alarmism. Private data firms like First Street market themselves as providing “forward-looking climate risk intelligence,” which sounds scientific but is, in practice, a speculative modeling exercise. In the case of the Uerkwitz home, the model’s dire prediction bore no relationship to empirical evidence. Yet Zillow plastered it across a public listing platform with enormous influence over market perception.

In effect, what First Street did for Zillow mirrors what climate activists have done for years in the political arena: assign numerical certainty to future catastrophe, then treat those numbers as incontrovertible truth. The difference is that, this time, there’s a paper trail, a quantifiable loss, and a defendant.

The plaintiffs are seeking $500,000 in damages—not only for the financial harm but for reputational injury to the property itself. It’s worth noting that Zillow has since quietly modified its listings to include FEMA’s own data and a disclaimer acknowledging potential “discrepancies” between flood assessments. This change, made only after the lawsuit was filed, suggests an implicit recognition that the data being presented may not have been reliable or appropriately contextualized.

This lawsuit raises a broader question that policymakers and data firms have so far ignored: Can private companies—and, by extension, governments—be held legally responsible for propagating unproven climate risk data that materially damages livelihoods? For years, the climate fear industry has operated under the assumption that predictions of doom are protected speech, or at worst, harmless “awareness raising.” But when those predictions affect markets, pricing, and consumer behavior, they cease to be abstract. They become economic actions with measurable consequences.

Consider what’s happening here. A model built on speculative assumptions projects a flood risk decades into the future. That projection is published without clear disclosure of its uncertainties. A buyer, seeing an “extreme risk” badge, walks away. The seller takes a six-figure loss. The model’s authors profit from licensing their data, while the marketplace absorbs the cost. That isn’t science—it’s commercialized fear.

Experts quoted in the piece defend First Street by claiming that FEMA flood maps are “out of date.” This is the standard refrain used to justify the expansion of private climate modeling firms. Yet FEMA’s maps, for all their flaws, are at least grounded in verifiable hydrological and historical data. First Street’s models, by contrast, are proprietary black boxes. They can’t be independently audited or falsified, which means they fail the most basic standard of scientific integrity.

The irony, of course, is that climate modeling’s defenders often accuse skeptics of “denialism.” Yet when their own predictions are challenged in court, the defense will likely rest on the claim that these are mere projections, “not meant to be taken as guarantees.” That argument may shield them from liability—but it also destroys the premise that their models are trustworthy guides for policy or investment.

Compass CEO Robert Reffkin, quoted in the same article, called such listings a “disservice” to homeowners, likening them to “tabloid headlines” designed to attract attention rather than inform buyers. His analogy is apt. Fear sells. Negative headlines, whether about hurricanes or home values, keep the clicks coming. And as long as the public continues to equate model output with objective reality, data firms have every incentive to amplify the drama.

But courts operate differently than activist NGOs or social media algorithms. Judges tend to ask for evidence. If this case proceeds, the discovery process could compel Zillow and First Street to disclose the methods, parameters, and assumptions behind their flood risk calculations. That transparency alone could be devastating to an industry built on proprietary secrecy. The plaintiffs’ attorneys will undoubtedly question how the company arrived at a 99% probability of flooding for a property that has never flooded, not even during major hurricanes Ida or Irene.

The implications reach far beyond real estate. If a climate data firm can be sued for damages arising from exaggerated risk claims, what about investment firms that downrate assets based on speculative climate models? What about insurance companies that raise premiums on the same basis? Or municipalities that depress property values through “resilience zoning” informed by faulty projections?

For years, climate activists have demanded that companies face liability for “climate denial.” The Uerkwitz case suggests that the opposite risk may now emerge: liability for climate exaggeration. If a firm’s data can demonstrably harm individuals through reckless presentation of unverified risks, courts may eventually impose the same standards of truthfulness expected in any other field of commerce.

This is not an attack on free speech—it’s a restoration of accountability. When predictions become products, they must meet the same evidentiary threshold as any other market claim. If First Street’s data turns out to be unreliable, then its dissemination through Zillow constitutes not awareness but defamation—against both people and property.

The broader lesson is that “climate transparency” is meaningless without accuracy. In their rush to align with environmental virtue, corporations like Zillow may have opened themselves to a new form of liability: not for ignoring climate change, but for overstating it. Fear, it turns out, is not a harmless marketing tool. It’s a quantifiable liability when it devalues assets, distorts markets, and undermines public trust.

The Uerkwitz lawsuit could be the first of many. If courts begin recognizing that climate risk data can inflict tangible economic harm, the entire architecture of climate fearmongering—from ESG scoring to catastrophe modeling—may soon find itself under legal scrutiny. The age of consequence may finally arrive, not for those who “deny” the crisis, but for those who profit from inventing it.