- The PSC should hold regular meetings on the situation in the Sahel region and request briefings from the ACHPR on the human rights situation in Burkina Faso, including on any accountability-related measures.
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
From 2021 through 2025, the M23 armed group, supported by the Rwandan military, has pursued its offensive in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo against Congolese security forces and an allied coalition of abusive militias called “Wazalendo” (Swahili for “patriots”). All parties to the conflict have carried out serious international humanitarian law violations, with grave consequences for civilians.
In 2024, Rwandan forces and M23 fighters indiscriminately shelled displacement camps and other densely populated areas near Goma, North Kivu’s capital. The Congolese army placed artillery positions and other military objectives close to the camps, putting civilians at unnecessary risk. Both sides perpetrated abuse against camp residents, including sexual violence.
In renewed fighting in 2025, the M23 and Rwandan forces captured Goma on January 27, and Bukavu, South Kivu’s capital, on February 16, heightening the risk faced by civilians and critically increasing humanitarian needs. In North and South Kivu provinces, M23 fighters have raided homes, made death threats, and threatened reprisals, undermining independent media and the work of civil society groups. M23 fighters have also detained civil society leaders and committed summary executions.
Human Rights Watch has called on the Rwandan forces and the M23 to ensure that civilians in eastern Congo, including displaced people, are not denied access to items essential for their survival.
The AU-backed Nairobi and Luanda Processes
The AU continually relied on subregional initiatives to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including the Nairobi and Luanda processes, under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), respectively.
Both initiatives were launched in 2022, with similar ambitions to put an end to hostilities through diplomatic avenues. They have focused mainly on mediation, with no tangible measures to protect civilians despite persisting conflict-related abuses, and stalled without yielding significant results.
The EAC-led Nairobi process was established during an April 2022 meeting between heads of state of the regional body. It includes a political track focusing on facilitating dialogue between warring parties, and a military aspect, which resulted in the deployment of troops “to help contain local and foreign armed groups” in November 2022. The EAC eventually withdrew its troops in December 2023. Tensions between Kenya and Congo and other issues have stalled the Nairobi process.
The Luanda process, aimed to mediate discussions between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, was established in the context of the ICGLR roadmap on the pacification process in the eastern region of the DRC (known as the Luanda roadmap) adopted in Luanda, Angola, on July 6, 2022, under the mediation of Angolan President João Lourenço. The process led to a ceasefire agreement in July 2024, but it was soon violated, months before a proposed meeting in December between President Paul Kagame and President Félix Tshisekedi was called off. Angola has since withdrawn from mediation efforts in the conflict.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also carried out efforts to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including deploying troops in support of the Congolese army in December 2023. The UN also maintains a peacekeeping presence in eastern Congo.
Other regional initiatives include the Quadripartite Summit of the EAC, ICGLR, SADC, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with UN participation, which the AU held in Luanda on June 27, 2023. The summit is said to have stemmed from the “need for a harmonized and coordinated approach […] to address the various security threats facing the Great Lakes Region.” Representatives from both Congolese and Rwandan governments participated. Participants adopted a joint framework aimed at coordinating existing peace initiatives “with a clear division of responsibilities and agreed timelines,” including creating a core group to foster information sharing and reporting to the PSC on a quarterly basis.
Chiefs of Defense from the participating organizations’ member states, Congo, and Rwanda convened in October 2023 as requested at the Quadripartite summit to further coordinate military activities in eastern Congo. No other Quadripartite Summit has been convened since then, whereas the deployment of several forces in eastern Congo calls for continued coordination of military activities, including ahead of the UN peacekeeping mission’s withdrawal requested by Congolese authorities.
The AU, including the PSC, has not explicitly called out abuses by all warring parties. In addition, it is yet to explicitly denounce Rwanda’s direct support to the abusive M23 armed group, despite clear evidence. Other partners of Rwanda have publicly called out its clear involvement with the M23 and some have adopted sanctions.
Regional Responses since Renewed Fighting in 2025
The renewed hostilities in late January prompted condemnation from the AUC. On January 28, the PSC also condemned the “heinous attacks by the M23” in its capture of Goma, and “any foreign military support being provided to M23 and any other armed group,” thus persisting in its unwillingness to explicitly name Rwanda’s support to the M23. The PSC mandated the AUC to immediately carry out a fact-finding mission to assess the situation.
The PSC also stated that “those concerned [in heinous attacks] will be held accountable for their actions” but it neither identified clear accountability avenues nor took any tangible steps in that direction. Impunity for abuses has been a key driver for ongoing cycles of abuses in Congo.
On February 8, EAC and SADC leaders met during a joint summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and decided to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The summit did not address abuses committed by all parties and did not call out Rwanda’s support to the M23.
At the 38th AU Summit, African leaders did not take decisive action on eastern Congo and further failed to explicitly condemn Rwanda’s backing to the M23. Members of the PSC met at the heads of state level on February 14 but still took no strong decision to address the crisis. They did not follow up on previous announcements to carry out a fact-finding mission, disregarding steps requested by civil society. AU leaders, however, endorsed the merging of the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
On March 13, SADC announced the phased withdrawal of its troops, but reaffirmed its commitment to supporting peace in Congo.
On March 17, EAC and SADC ministers of defense agreed on a roadmap detailing measures to achieve peace in eastern DRC. On March 24, EAC and SADC leaders held a second joint summit directing the implementation of the roadmap and appointed five former presidents as members of a panel tasked with facilitating talks between Rwanda and Congo. The panel met for the first time on April 5, mainly to discuss the implementation of the roadmap.
On March 24, the Angolan presidency also announced ending its mediation role with regard to the conflict in eastern Congo, to focus on other priorities set up as part of their AU chairperson mandate.
The ACHPR has raised alarm about the situation facing civilians, including internally displaced people, and exhorted the Congolese government to put an end to impunity for all perpetrators of “acts of violence.” The human rights body is however yet to take strong action to address conflict-related abuses in eastern Congo, including investigating abuses and rights violations by all parties. Its statement following the M23’s Goma capture denounced abuses by non-state actors but was silent on Congolese and Rwandan forces’ responsibility for abuses.
Recommendations:
The AUC’s celebration of the anniversary of the agreement in March 2024 was thus hasty in the face of continued abuses.
The November 2022 agreement outlined measures to implement the Ethiopian government’s commitment to create a transitional justice policy aimed at “accountability, truth, redress, reconciliation, and healing.” Since then, the Ethiopian authorities have gradually weakened international involvement in the transitional justice process and shrunk the national civic space. This curtailed opportunities for objective scrutiny into the process, and to assess the transitional justice policy’s compliance with regional standards, including the AU’s transitional justice framework. It is unclear if the process will ensure the prosecution of perpetrators of grave abuses during the conflict in fair trials.
The ACHPR prematurely terminated the mandate of its Commission of Inquiry on Tigray, established in May 2021 to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Tigray and identify perpetrators for accountability purposes. The Commission never published a report of its findings and recommendations despite some two years of work, setting a dangerous precedent for other ACHPR-mandated investigations.
The PSC has still not paid enough attention to other conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, including in the Amhara region, where armed conflict broke out between Ethiopian government forces and Fano militia in August 2023 and is ongoing. The UN, human rights groups, and the media have reported on war crimes in Amhara, including unlawful attacks on civilians, summary killings, unlawful drone strikes, attacks on and unlawful use of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and mass arrests without due process. Fighting persists in the region and has triggered a human rights and humanitarian crisis in Amhara and the country more broadly, yet few of Ethiopia’s regional and international partners have responded or weighed in on the situation.
Recommendations: