Bangladesh, the Rakhine Corridor, and the Lethal Convergence of Humanitarianism and Geopolitics

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By Ghulam Suhrawardi

This article is written to give an introspective and critical examination of Bangladesh’s evolving stance on the proposed UN-led humanitarian corridor into Myanmar’s conflict-affected Rakhine State. Central to the controversy is a profound tension between humanitarian responsibility and national security—a moral imperative for alleviating human suffering, weighed against geopolitical intervention risks. Laid over the background of famine, displacement, and war in Rakhine, the article unpicks the rich layers of crisis in play. It addresses the long-term consequences of Bangladesh’s potential action. It analyzes the competing interests of primary regional and global actors—primarily China, India, and the United Nations—demonstrating how altruistically motivated relief action could reshape the balance of power across South Asia. While Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus, has been firm in stating that no decision at this stage has been made, the article suggests a principled but pragmatic strategy—one that keeps respect for the dignity of human life intact without compromising national sovereignty or regional stability.

A Humanitarian Lifeline or a Strategic Gamble?

Bangladesh’s conditional promise to open a UN-run humanitarian corridor into Myanmar’s war-torn Rakhine State is an act of moral courage and regional responsibility. In a world age when the world looks on, Dhaka’s decision could bring salvation to over a million civilians trapped between civil war and natural disaster. But behind the gesture lies a perilous minefield of geopolitics. What began as a relief corridor is at risk of becoming a deep and sustained engagement in Myanmar’s civil conflict and a matter of profound national security, regional alliance, and domestic political consequence for Bangladesh.

Rakhine on the Brink: A Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds

Rakhine State is on the edge of humanitarian collapse. Myanmar’s military, in its increasingly vicious battle with the Arakan Army (AA), has leveled a brutal blockade, withholding food, medicine, and necessities from civilians. The effects of the 2025 earthquake only aggravated the crisis, destroying buildings, flattening homes, and displacing thousands more in already vulnerable terrain. Over 1.2 million residents—both Rohingya Muslims and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists—are now at immediate risk of famine.

 

Bangladesh, already hosting close to 1.3 million Rohingya refugees since the great exodus of 2017, cannot accommodate another flow. The refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar are already overcrowded, ridden with disease and malnutrition, and with unrest brewing. The specter of new arrivals in the face of destabilizing spillover from Rakhine is both genuine and pressing.

The Corridor Proposal: Relief Wrapped in Risk

The UN initiative to open a humanitarian corridor through Bangladesh suggests bypassing the Myanmar military siege and delivering aid directly into areas of conflict. There is a humanitarian sense, the humanitarian imperative is pressing, and precedents have been established. Bangladesh’s cooperation is lukewarm, seasoned with extreme reservations. Dhaka fears that armed forces will grab the established corridor, use it as an arms depot, or use it as an excuse for extra-regional players to intrude on its territory.

Security analysts warn that non-state entities like the AA could exploit the bargain. There is a grave danger of weapons smuggling, penetrations of intelligence, and border instability. Furthermore, hosting foreign soldiers on Bangladeshi territory—even under the UN banner—raises sovereignty concerns.

A Divided Domestic Front: Humanitarian Vision Meets Political Dissonance

The proposed humanitarian corridor has evoked diplomatic considerations abroad and ignited a controversy back home in the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Far from being a popular project, the corridor has emerged to reveal underlying government fault lines, resulting in mass anxiety among political and civil society segments.

The first signals of dissonance came on April 27, when Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain spoke on the record in cautious endorsement of the UN effort while restating that any involvement would be contingent on “strong security assurances” and “strictly neutral humanitarian goals.” His statements opened the door to a phased rollout of Bangladesh’s involvement, contained in a closely hedged diplomatic structure.

But this original support was subsequently contradicted by Chief Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam, who, at a subsequent briefing, categorically rejected the report that Bangladesh had accepted any such offer. His statement, a few days on, added another layer of official ambiguity and created confusion domestically and internationally. The mixed signals suggested intra-governmental coordination failure or deliberate political hedging against growing domestic opposition.

A Chorus of Condemnation: Sovereignty, Suspicion, and Strategic Fear

This perceived duplicity has drawn sharp condemnation from across Bangladesh’s political and religious spectrum. Major opposition parties—including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), Jamaat-e-Islami, various Islamic alliance parties, and even the influential non-political religious body Hefazat-e-Islam—have united in their vocal opposition to the proposed corridor. They argue that such an initiative, regardless of its humanitarian intent, threatens to erode national sovereignty and entangle Bangladesh in a dangerous foreign quagmire.

These groups contend that allowing international humanitarian operations—particularly on Bangladeshi soil adjacent to an active conflict zone—could establish a precedent for foreign encroachment under the guise of benevolence. The concerns are manifold: covert intelligence-gathering, unauthorized geopolitical maneuvering, and even the stealth militarization of aid channels. In their view, history offers numerous cautionary tales where humanitarian access became a Trojan horse for long-term strategic domination. Their criticism, though politically charged, taps into deep-rooted anxieties about external interference and the erosion of Bangladesh’s autonomous decision-making in matters of national security.

Leaders of opposition parties and civil society activists have drawn historical parallels with earlier international interventions that began as humanitarian exercises but ultimately developed into instruments of strategic hegemony. The BNP invoked NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, which started in the guise of defending civilians and ultimately resulted in de facto secession by Kosovo and permanent Western dominance of the Balkans. Similarly, Hefazat-e-Islam has equated the proposal with Turkey’s humanitarian corridors in northern Syria, under which Ankara took de facto control of rebel-held territory in the guise of humanitarian engagement.

While these are exaggerations, they reflect an underlying sense of national discomfort: that Bangladesh, already deeply strained from the Rohingya crisis, would become a theater of higher-level games between the West, China, and India. It is not the immediate threat of direct security but the incremental erosion of sovereignty, political unity, and the ability to maintain a non-aligned stance in regional foreign policy.

Compounding the challenge is the timing of the debate. The interim government, led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, is ruling during a politically sensitive transition period. Opposition forces would be found upon any perceived misstep, bent on discrediting the validity of the interim government. For the Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, the government, treading the high wire between humanitarian responsibility and national legitimacy has become a more delicate challenge.

Fundamentally, the corridor controversy has become a proxy war cry for broader questions about sovereignty, neutrality, and Bangladesh’s role in a more fragmented regional order. Unless these domestic divides are bridged through transparent policy-making, inclusive consultations, and clear communications, the corridor initiative could stagnate under internal controversy.

In selective Outrage and Strategic Amnesia: The hypocrisy Behind the Corridor Critique

It is highly ironic that the same political stakeholders now warning about the proposed UN-backed humanitarian corridor into Myanmar’s Rakhine State remained ominously silent when the erstwhile Sheikh Hasina regime unilaterally granted India sweeping access to Bangladesh’s strategic infrastructure—without reciprocity, oversight, or public accountability. In the spirit of regional connectivity, Hasina’s administration opened the roads, rails, and ports of Bangladesh to Indian transit to its “Seven Sisters” states in northeast India. The Chattogram and Mongla ports were made accessible to Indian commercial interests under highly concessional terms, with only nominal fees imposed—offering India substantial logistical advantages with minimal financial obligations.

More seriously, these deals facilitated trade and potential future military logistics across Bangladeshi territory, raising existential questions about sovereignty and national interest. Yet amidst this wholesale surrender of bargaining leverage, major political forces and civil society offered no effective opposition. There were no countrywide protests, parliamentary battles, or transparency demands.

Their holier-than-thou outrage now—when a interim administration under Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus considers a strictly humanitarian program to assuage the plight of war-battered Rakhine’s millions—sends a hollow ring. Their hypocrisy is disquieting proof of a double standard in their selective indignation. There was only silence when corridors responded to India’s geopolitical and economic interests. However, if a corridor is proposed to further human interest and reaffirm Bangladesh’s moral leadership in South Asia, it will be met with venom and political show. This kind of posturing serves not only to discredit principled debate but also exposes the highly politicized lens through which national interest is increasingly defined.

Humanitarian Corridors: A Legal Grey Zone

Humanitarian corridors are operating in legal limbo. Denial of humanitarian aid is a war crime under law, but no binding treaty legalizes the entitlement to establish cross-border corridors. They are typically ad hoc arrangements negotiated under diplomatic coercion and must be brought into operation with informal agreement between all parties—host countries, aid agencies, and often combatants.

Bangladesh must ensure that the corridor is, in fact, humanitarian in nature—depoliticized, transparent, and time-bound. Uncertainty may embroil Dhaka in regional wars and diplomatic condemnation.

Myanmar’s Reaction: Rejection and Retaliation

The Myanmar military junta has rejected the offer in so many words, denouncing it as an act of sovereignty infringement. They are fearful, not without reason, that aid will empower the AA insurgency.   The AA has accepted humanitarian relief with a guarded welcome but insists that giving relief should never be a pretext for junta control or foreign interference.

Cross-border shelling by Myanmar into Bangladesh, border skirmishes, and increasing tension with the expanding territorial influence of AA all point to the precariousness of the situation. Dhaka is faced with the monumental task of balancing compassion against containment.

China and India: Silent, Strategic Stakeholders

China has invested heavily in Rakhine through its Belt and Road Initiative, notably developing the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and energy pipelines to secure direct access to the Bay of Bengal and bypass the Strait of Malacca. India, meanwhile, has funded infrastructure in Rakhine to link its northeastern states—the “Seven Sisters”—to the sea, enhancing regional connectivity.

Through the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, India seeks to connect its northeastern states with the Bay of Bengal via Sittwe Port. Both projects traverse or are near regions of intense ethnic conflict and displacement; thus, stability in Rakhine is essential for their success.

Despite these stakes, Beijing and New Delhi have maintained suspicious silence over the corridor. Neither wants to destabilize relations with Myanmar’s military junta, and neither supports steps perceived to promote Western influence in the region. This strategic silence exposes Bangladesh—sandwiched between great-power rivalries and humanitarian imperatives.

The Rohingya Dilemma: A Protracted Crisis

The Rohingya are among the world’s most persecuted and stateless communities. They have been denied citizenship and made politically, legally, and economically invisible under Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship law. In Bangladesh, they are still being detained in overcrowded refugee camps where conditions continue to deteriorate.

Years of limbo have exacted their price. Education is curtailed, employment is prohibited, and travel is restricted. There is a risk that a generation of Rohingya children will become unskilled, inopportune, and stateless. Mental illness is increasing, fueled by trauma, poor quality of life, and insecurity.

Pressures on Bangladesh: A Nation Under Strain

Having hosted more than a million refugees has put the public services, infrastructure, and host communities in Bangladesh under tremendous strain. Host-community-refugee tensions are on the rise, particularly in sparse-resource areas such as Cox’s Bazar. Increased crime rates, apprehensions of radicalization, and the rise of militant outfits have made security dynamics a complex issue.

With the ebb of international funding for the camps and waning global interest, Bangladesh is forced to carry the unsustainable burden of hosting an open-ended crisis on dwindling resources. The world’s response to the government’s call for responsibility-sharing—repatriation, third-country resettlement, or significant aid—is lacking.

International Community: Engagement Without Commitment

Although publicly sympathetic, the global community has not been able to offer tangible solutions. Through agencies like UNHCR and UNICEF, the UN continues to provide much-needed assistance. But diplomatic pressure to make Myanmar restore its citizens, the Rohingya, their citizenship, security, and dignity has been in vain.

China and India, interested in Myanmar, have chosen to forego moral responsibility for pragmatism. Though more vocal, Western powers have not yet translated rhetoric into policy—offering neither a workable resettlement plan nor diplomatic leverage to press the junta into bargaining.

Towards a Workable Way Forward: An Action Blueprint Which Avoids Strategic Backlash

To traverse the dubious terrain of humanitarian intervention in a volatile state like Rakhine requires more than it requires in terms of ethical commitment—it requires a multi-faceted, precision-crafted diplomatic framework. For Bangladesh, a nation already burdened with the world’s largest stateless refugee population, cooperation with the proposed humanitarian corridor must be couched in terms of mechanisms that balance humanity with prudence and relief with realism. To move forward constructively, Dhaka ought to support the corridor based on a robust and enforceable framework built upon the following pillars:

  1. Tripartite Agreement for Neutrality and Safe Access

A binding tripartite agreement among the United Nations, the Government of Myanmar, and the Arakan Army (AA) is the key pillar in any feasible humanitarian intervention. Such an arrangement would have to guarantee impartiality in providing assistance, grant secure passage for humanitarian convoys, and ensure aid supplies are not being redirected for military use. Absent formal acquiescence by both sides—the Myanmar junta and the AA—there is a danger the corridor will become another front in the civil war rather than a conduit for peace. The agreement should ensure localized ceasefires, clearly marked routes, and rules of engagement for humanitarian staff to prevent politicization or militarization of aid.

  1. Third-Party Monitoring to Ensure Transparency and Accountability

Neutral and legitimate third-party monitors ensure transparency, accountability, and respect for international humanitarian norms.  Because of its geographical proximity and diplomatic influence, ASEAN should be hired as a monitoring agency, supplemented by trusted, neutral countries with experience in humanitarian diplomacy, such as Norway or Switzerland. These monitors must be given unfettered access to both sides of the corridor, including cross-border zones in Bangladesh and Myanmar, and make periodic reporting to the UN Security Council and regional stakeholders. Such oversight will help prevent abuse, give confidence to stakeholders, and discourage potential breaches by either party.

  1. China’s and India’s Strategic Assurances

As silent but strategic players in Rakhine, China and India must be engaged in the diplomatic sphere to prevent strategic sabotage and ensure regional ownership. Bangladesh should require official public assurances from New Delhi and Beijing to honor the territorial sovereignty of its territorial integrity and not indulge in any military adventurism or proxy activism involved in China’s Belt and Road infrastructure and India’s Kaladan Transit Project. As large investors, both nations are keen on regional stability. Their constructive engagement may contain the spillover potential and alert Myanmar’s junta that the one-sided military coup of the crisis will not be tolerated.

  1. Linking Humanitarian Aid to a Repatriation Plan

Humanitarian access must never be an end but a path to a long-lasting solution. Bangladesh must link any suggested corridor to a complete UN-overprovisioned plan for the safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees. This would require the Myanmar junta—despite its diminishing control over large parts of Rakhine State now under the de facto authority of the Arakan Army—to commit to establishing verifiable conditions for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of the Rohingya. Central to this process is the formal recognition of Rohingya citizenship, the assurance of unrestricted freedom of movement, and the restoration of property and land rights unjustly stripped from them.

Equally essential is the active engagement of international stakeholders, who must pledge substantial support for reconstruction, reconciliation, and institutional rebuilding in Rakhine. Without such coordinated efforts, any repatriation plan risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive—failing to address the root causes of displacement and undermining the prospects for lasting peace. This approach also aligns with international standards via the Global Compact on Refugees, which is based on equitable responsibility-sharing and durable solutions, including return and resettlement channels. Without this linkage, the corridor would be merely a palliative measure that bypasses the root causes of the Rohingya crisis and traps Bangladesh in an infinite loop of perpetual hosting.

The challenges are immense but not insurmountable. Through ethical diplomacy, regional assistance, and multilateral efforts, Bangladesh can help build a humanitarian lifeline that also paves the way for peace. To accomplish this, it needs to do more than serve as a transit nation for relief; it must also serve as a moral and strategic actor shaping an equitable solution to one of Asia’s greatest human dramas.

Conclusion: A Delicate Exercise of Leadership in a Region on the Brink

Interim Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus and his interim government have to confront one of the most fine balancing acts in Bangladesh’s recent history—where compassion has to walk alongside prudence, and moral leadership be counterpoised by geopolitical acumen. The proposed humanitarian corridor includes entering Myanmar’s Rakhine State, not as much a logistical issue—it’s a test of Bangladesh’s national ethos and diplomatic maturity. It’s an offer of a lifeline to battered people, away from the cost of regional suspicion, security vulnerabilities, and risks of being pulled into a protracted cross-border conflict.

In a world where humanitarian aid all too often becomes a tool for political power politics, Bangladesh must tread with lucidity, solidarity, and unyielding strategic foresight. Winston Churchill once said, “The price of greatness is responsibility.” Today, Bangladesh is confronted with that bill—trying to act humanely while protecting its sovereignty, national interest, and fragile political consensus.

This turning point calls for more than goodness—it calls for openness, international burden-sharing, and tight controls to prevent abuse of the corridor by cynical state or non-state actors. Bangladesh must demand independent monitoring, equitable diplomatic consultation, and a direct relationship between emergency relief and eventual repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

Humanitarianism without naïveté—stripped of romantic illusions yet firmly anchored in moral conviction—is the only viable path forward. The implications of Bangladesh’s decision extend well beyond the confines of Cox’s Bazar or the conflict-scarred town of Maungdaw; they will shape the broader trajectory of South Asian stability, test the resilience and relevance of international humanitarian law, and define the legacy of Bangladesh’s transitional leadership on a stage fraught with global scrutiny. In one of the world’s most volatile humanitarian arenas, the choices made today will echo far into the region’s diplomatic, ethical, and historical future.



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