China’s “Bohai Sea Monster” just surfaced – an experimental sea-skimming aircraft that blurs the line between ship and plane, promising stealthy speed but raising strategic questions.
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that the first full image of China’s experimental wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft, unofficially dubbed the “Bohai Sea Monster,” surfaced this week, providing unprecedented insight into its design and potential applications.
Initially observed in obscured imagery on a Bohai Sea pier, the aircraft exhibits characteristics reminiscent of the AG600 amphibious flying boat and the US Liberty Lifter, both designed for high-speed, low-altitude transport across littoral zones.
Equipped with a joined v-tail, wingtip sponsons, amidships floats, composite structure, and a stepped hull, the WIG’s configuration favors cargo delivery and personnel recovery while minimizing radar exposure and vulnerability to naval threats. Propulsion remains uncertain; while jet-engine exhausts are suggested, visual inconsistencies raise the possibility of turboprop or hybrid-electric systems.
The aircraft’s potential roles span logistics, search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare, and contested combat zone recovery missions, particularly within China’s immediate maritime vicinity.
Given China’s geographic advantage and increasing focus on maritime power projection, this platform may serve as either a technology demonstrator or precursor to scaled production. Analysts expect further imagery and technical data to emerge, enhancing clarity on China’s ambitions in leveraging ground-effect technologies for strategic mobility and survivability in near-sea operations.
The main tactical advantage of WIG craft is that they are designed to fly just above the water’s surface, allowing them to be much faster and more efficient than ships while staying below the radar horizon.
However, Anil Chopra notes in a July 2022 article for the Center of Air Power Studies (CAPS) that WIG aircraft face notable limitations, including maneuverability constraints in congested environments, susceptibility to obstacle interference and vulnerability under severe weather conditions.
Chopra adds that while advantageous in low-altitude flight for radar evasion, their reliance on stable sea states – especially during amphibious operations – may impair mission continuity. He further explains that despite improved endurance and payload over vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) systems, WIG platforms require extensive infrastructure, such as large hangars, and offer limited altitude flexibility for tactical repositioning.
Chopra notes that adverse conditions may necessitate a diversion to higher altitudes, which reduces stealth benefits. He also highlights that radar detection remains feasible at ultra-low altitudes, potentially compromising survivability against integrated air defenses.
Production viability may also be in question. As Justin Katz observes in a November 2022 article for Breaking Defense, the Soviet Union built several WIG craft, such as the Lun-class, but failed to produce a design viable for mass production. The implication for China is that despite technological advances, moving from prototype to fleet-scale deployment remains a formidable challenge.
At the operational level, China’s WIG craft may play critical roles in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and possibly beyond the First Island Chain.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in April 2023 that a WIG based in Hainan could reach any point in the disputed South China Sea within four hours and transport passengers or cargo between Chinese-controlled islands in the region. SCMP notes that WIGs could be critical assets for a fast transport network between China and its occupied islands in the South China Sea.
In a Taiwan Strait conflict, H.I. Sutton notes in a June 2025 Naval News article, China’s new WIG would be particularly suited for amphibious landing operations. The author points out that some Soviet designs were intended to deliver troops and armored vehicles directly onto enemy beaches. Supporting this notion, Walker Mills and other writers in a September 2020 Proceedings article describe how a fleet of 10 Soviet Lun-class WIGs could cross the Baltic Sea with minimal radar signature in just 12 minutes and land 5,000 troops without warning.
However, the Taiwan Strait presents environmental challenges that could limit WIG use during an invasion. In a November 2024 report for the US Naval War College, Andrew Erickson and other authors note that China faces numerous obstacles in executing an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait.
The Taiwan Strait presents environmental challenges that could limit WIG use during an invasion
They point out that the strait’s 130-kilometer-wide waters are prone to rough sea states, limiting viable landing days to about 10 per month during favorable seasons. They add that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) amphibious sealift capability is insufficient to sustain a large-scale, multi-wave landing force.
Moreover, they state that Taiwan’s coastal topography – characterized by cliffs, narrow beaches and urban sprawl – further constrains viable landing zones. They also mention that Taiwan’s precision strike capabilities, layered coastal defenses and early warning systems would likely disrupt cross-strait logistics and troop buildup.
Beyond transport roles, China may consider constructing a combat variant of its WIG. Michael Knickerbocker notes in a March 2022 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that wing-in-ground maritime attack craft (WMACs) offer disruptive tactical advantages by exploiting radar limitations with low-elevation, sea-skimming profiles and unpredictable flight patterns.
Knickerbocker explains that WMACs – capable of exceeding 250 knots within surface ducting zones – can evade radar filters by mimicking false tracks, stress-testing watch stander training and radar logic. Their small crew requirements, short launch distances, and integration of countermeasures enhance survivability while executing off-axis anti-ship missile strikes.
H.I. Sutton illustrates Knickerbocker’s ideas in an August 2020 article, noting that the Soviet Lun-class WIG was built to attack US Navy warships in a coastal defense role, operating as a missile boat capable of covering a much larger area.
Sutton adds that a three-ship formation of Lun-class WIGs could close in to within 35 kilometers of a target vessel—nearly point-blank range for their Moskit supersonic anti-ship missiles, leaving minimal reaction time for defenses. He notes that a single Moskit missile has a range of 96 kilometers, and three Lun-class WIGs could collectively fire 18 such missiles at Mach 3.
Yet Sutton points out that the Lun-class WIG was vastly inferior to the Tu-22 bomber in maritime strike roles, rendering it a costly and limited alternative to conventional airpower. Similarly, China now fields the KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), which can be deployed from H-6K strategic bombers, possibly rendering a future combat WIG redundant.
Whether it becomes a game-changer or an expensive curiosity, China’s sea-skimming “monster” is making waves, above and below the radar.