| Expert Authority (pp. 1–7) |
Consensus = correctness. |
Minority views = “fringe,” excluded. |
Circular logic: consensus is both evidence and conclusion. |
| Uncertainty in Models (pp. 12 vs 18) |
Models reliable for global trends. |
Models unreliable for regional impacts. |
Double standard: same tool treated as solid/weak depending on usefulness. |
| Economic Projections (pp. 25 vs 28) |
Climate damages = robust, quantifiable. |
Transition costs = speculative. |
Inconsistent: both are speculative, but treated oppositely. |
| Short-term vs Long-term Data (p. 30) |
Short-term anomalies validate projections. |
Elsewhere: short-term = “noise.” |
Overreach: weather ≠ century-scale proof. |
| Adaptation (pp. 35–36) |
Adaptation insufficient. |
Adaptation historically reduced vulnerability. |
Contradiction: success evidence ignored in forward dismissal. |
| Historical Analogies (p. 38) |
Recent extremes unprecedented. |
Pre-industrial extremes acknowledged elsewhere. |
Cherry-picking baselines to suit narrative. |
| Markets vs Policy (pp. 40 vs 42) |
Only government can fix risks. |
Markets adapt better, policy distorts. |
Policy framed as both essential and ineffective. |
| Equity Framing (pp. 45–48) |
Equity demands urgent mitigation. |
Energy transition raises costs for poor. |
Contradiction: policies harm those they claim to protect. |
| Energy Transition Costs (p. 52) |
Renewables cheapest option. |
Require subsidies to compete. |
Undermines own economic claim. |
| Natural Variability (p. 60) |
Recent warming outside natural bounds. |
Internal variability invoked to explain regional differences. |
Opportunistic uncertainty use. |
| Innovation Timeline (pp. 70–72) |
Rapid tech breakthroughs likely. |
But uncertainty requires subsidies/mandates now. |
Contradiction: optimism vs pessimism. |
| Risk Framing (p. 80) |
Impacts certain enough for urgent action. |
Impacts remain highly uncertain. |
Selective framing of certainty. |
| Nuclear Energy (p. 85) |
“All zero-carbon needed.” |
Nuclear dismissed as too costly/slow. |
Contradicts stated inclusivity. |
| Geoengineering (p. 95) |
“Dangerous, speculative.” |
Acknowledged as emergency fallback. |
Simultaneously dismissed and reserved. |
| Final Policy (pp. 110–115) |
“Science settled” → mandate decarb. |
Future assessments still needed. |
Tension: finality vs evolving science. |
| Climate Sensitivity (pp. 115–120) |
DOE overemphasizes ECS. |
Review favors TCR/TCRE but admits uncertainty. |
Contradiction: faults DOE for privileging one metric while doing the same. |
| Use of Bayesian Priors (p. 118) |
Priors = methodological error. |
Priors valid in consensus assessments. |
Selective: logic changes by context. |
| Cherry-picking Evidence (p. 120, 277) |
DOE cherry-picks low ECS studies. |
Review ignores warming acceleration & aerosol uncertainties. |
Both sides cherry-pick; reviewers not consistent. |
| Attribution Methods (pp. 276–278) |
DOE undermines fingerprinting. |
Review claims robustness but dismisses DOE’s statistical alternatives. |
Contradiction: demands breadth but restricts methods to mainstream. |
| Solar Variability (pp. 300–305) |
DOE exaggerates solar influence. |
Review insists only low-variability reconstructions valid. |
Contradiction: uncertainty admitted yet treated as settled. |
| Consilience / Multiple Lines (p. 270) |
DOE neglects consilience. |
Review invokes consilience but ignores divergences (e.g., models vs observations). |
“Proof by consilience” ignores breakdowns. |
| Extreme Events & CIDs (pp. 321–325) |
DOE confuses “lack of studies” with “lack of signal.” |
Review insists absence of evidence ≠ evidence of absence, but elsewhere uses absence as refutation. |
Oy |